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 When it comes to elections and government, Sweden and Finland seem relatively similar 
on the surface. Both Scandinavian countries are in the top ten in the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) for voter turnout, both have automatic voter registration, 
neither has compulsory voting, both use some form of proportional representation (PR) in their 
legislative elections, both have multiparty systems (Desilver 2016), and both have undergone 
fairly significant governmental changes—including changing electoral systems and outright 
independence—in the last century (Sӓrlvik 2002, 247-254; Sundberg 2002, 67-68). However, 
Sweden has a 10-18 percentage point higher voter turnout than Finland. In their most recent 
elections—2014 and 2015 respectively—Swedish turnout was at roughly 82% of the voting age 
population and 86% of registered voters, while Finnish turnout was at roughly 72% and 68% 
(Desilver 2016). Despite their similarities, why is there a difference in turnout between Sweden 
and Finland? The answer lies in the two countries’ electoral systems; they both use PR, but not 
the same type (Sӓrlvik 2002, 252-253; Sundberg 2002, 85). The most important factors in 
explaining why Sweden has higher voter turnout than Finland are the differences in their 
electoral systems. 
Voter turnout itself is important, regardless of which election(s) and/or country/countries. 
The act of voting serves as an indicator of political participation, and turnout is frequently used 
as an indicator of overall political participation. It is both “the most common form of political 
activity” and, at least in theory, the most equal—one person has one vote, regardless of other 
factors. In fact, many political scientists see low voter turnout as the “canary in the coal mine” 
indicating a more serious issue within the population. In addition, the people who vote are the 
ones making some kind of decision on what the makeup of their country’s government will be. 
Lower turnout means fewer people are making this decision, and the resulting government is less 
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representative of the country’s population in general. Higher turnout leads to the reverse: more 
people making decisions and a more representative government (Jackman and Miller 2004, 137-
138). 
However, voter turnout differs from country to country. Assuming voter turnout is 
indicative of broader political participation, some countries have more people participating 
politically than others. These differences are quite important: some countries end up having less 
representative governments than others (Jackman and Miller 2004, 137-138). And these 
differences can be drastic. While Sweden and Finland have differences in turnout of ten to 
twenty percentage points, voter turnout varies more drastically worldwide. Turnout in Belgium is 
over 80%, while turnout in the United States is just under 55% (Desilver 2016). Given these 
sometimes drastic differences, asking why such differences exist is very important. If a person or 
country wants to know how to increase voter turnout somewhere, or just why their voter turnout 
is where it is, they need to know what factors lead to higher (or lower) turnout. 
There are a lot of factors that can influence voter turnout, and political scientists have 
studied many of them. For example, three of the five OECD countries with the highest levels of 
voter turnout have compulsory voting laws, which require registered voters to actually vote or 
face some sort of penalty. And they do have a noticeable impact on turnout. Chile, an OECD 
member country, had a compulsory voting law up until 2012. In the election prior to abandoning 
compulsory voting, turnout was at 87% of registered voters, while turnout in the first election 
without compulsory voting was only 46%. Another factor that can influence voter turnout is the 
presence (or absence) of some kind of automatic voter registration. Automatic voter registration 
shifts the responsibility for registering to vote from the eligible voter to the government. The 
presence or absence of automatic registration happens to lead to similar—or different, if there is 
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no automatic registration—turnout percentages between eligible voters and registered voters. 
This impacts turnout more in terms of making it easier to measure, since the two numbers are 
closer together (Desilver 2016).  
James Endersby and Jonathan Krieckhaus mention automatic voter registration in the 
context of their article arguing that electoral systems impact voter turnout. Based on their study 
of countries around the world, they argue that the type of electoral system a country possesses 
does influence its level of voter turnout, but only under certain circumstances. When considering 
level of democracy, electoral systems have a greater effect on turnout in fully democratic 
countries than less democratic countries. They also matter less in new democracies, where voters 
have less experience with how their votes affect the election outcome. In terms of how one 
measures turnout, they argue that using voter turnout based on eligible voters rather than based 
on registered voters makes the effect of electoral systems stronger. In general though, they argue 
that electoral systems do influence voter turnout to some degree, with PR producing higher 
turnout than any type of system with single-member districts (Endersby and Krieckhaus 2008, 
601-608). 
In addition to arguments about voter turnout in PR systems in general versus plurality and 
majoritarian systems (Endersby and Krieckhaus 2008, 601), political scientists have also argued 
about the differences between types of PR. In their study of the differences in proportionality 
among different types of PR—with a focus on the one in use in South Africa, L van Eck, S.E. 
Visagie, and H.C. de Kock discuss the different types, including the d’Hondt method and the 
Sainte-Laguë method, and all of which they explain in detail. They argue that, between the two 
methods, the latter is actually slightly more proportional than the latter. However, this argument 
is contingent of the form of the Sainte-Laguë method being used. While the pure Sainte-Laguë 
4 
 
method is more proportional, the modified version is almost identical to the d’Hondt method, so 
the difference in proportionality depends on the variation of the system used (van Eck, Visagie, 
and de Kock 2005, 93-97). 
Robert Jackman and Ross Miller also argue for the influence of electoral systems on 
voter turnout, but as one institution among the broader influence of institutions on voter turnout. 
In a chapter on institutions and voter turnout in their book Before Norms, they argue that 
institutions—and not cultural values—are the factors that influence voter turnout. The 
institutional factors they use are nationally competitive elections, electoral proportionality, the 
number of political parties, unicameralism in the legislature, and compulsory voting laws (or 
lack thereof). Three of the authors’ institutional factors are influenced by the type of electoral 
system a country possesses: nationally competitive elections, electoral proportionality, and the 
number of political parties. The cultural factors that they analyzed include need for achievement 
and civic values. Where the institutional factors did turn out to have an impact on voter 
turnout—which depended on the type of electoral system in use, the cultural factors did not, 
regardless of the electoral system (Jackman and Miller 2004, 137-143, 154-162). 
While the two previous pieces studied voter turnout in multiple countries (Endersby and 
Krieckhaus 2008, 601-608; Jackman and Miller 2004, 137-143, 154-162), Maciej Górecki 
focuses on Sweden specifically. In her article, she looks at the impact of election closeness and 
habit formation on voter turnout across sixteen Swedish elections between 1956 and 2006. 
Specifically, she is testing whether or not the electoral context an individual is exposed to when 
they first become eligible to vote matters when they establish a habit of voting/not voting. 
Górecki focuses on the election closeness aspect of electoral context because, she argues, it can 
change regardless of the change/consistency of other aspects, like a country’s electoral system. 
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She concludes that, while electoral closeness has less of an impact on a high turnout country like 
Sweden, it does have a measurable impact on those who have been eligible to vote in fewer 
elections. Those individuals are more strongly affected by electoral context; if their initial 
experiences are in less close elections, then they are less likely to vote, and develop a habit of not 
voting (Górecki 2013, 234-236, 243-245). 
Meanwhile, Mikael Persson, Hanna Wass, and Jenrik Oscarsson focus on the 
generational effect on turnout in their article, as seen through fifty years’ worth of national 
election data from Sweden. The generational effect refers to the pattern of younger age groups 
showing lower voter turnout rates for longer, instead of consistently voting at higher rates as they 
grow older. As a result, overall voter turnout continues to decline over time. The authors try to 
account for what looks like a noticeable generational effect in their research by controlling for 
different institutional and individual factors, including level of political interest, proportion of 
party members in the electorate, effective number of parties, and election competitiveness. They 
conclude that controlling for the proportion of party members in the electorate and the effective 
number of political parties both reduce the generational effect, while controlling for level of 
political interest and election competitiveness has no impact on the generational effect (Persson, 
Wass, and Oscarsson 2013, 249-265). 
Like Persson, Wass, and Oscarsson (Persson, Wass, and Oscarsson 2013, 249-265), 
Elisabeth Gidengil, Hanna Wass, and Maria Valaste focus on non-institutional factors, 
specifically parents’ influence on whether or not their children vote. Specifically, they test two 
different theories—status transmission theory and social learning theory—based on data from 
Finland’s 1999 parliamentary election. Status transmission theory argues that parents’ 
socioeconomic status is key in their children’s political involvement. Well-educated and/or high-
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status parents tend to pass that status onto their children; the high status makes them more likely 
to vote. On the other hand, the social learning theory argues that children develop a tendency to 
vote (or not vote) based on watching whether or not their parents vote. The authors conclude that 
while parental education does have an impact on the child’s voting by way of parental turnout 
and the child’s level of education—according to status transmission theory—parental turnout is 
the more influential aspect, much like in social learning theory. Status transmission theory does 
not really work in Finland, where children tend to have higher education than their parents, but 
watching their parents vote (or not vote) has an impact on whether or not they vote (Gidengil, 
Wass, and Valaste 2016, 373-381). 
In addition to studying various factors that can influence voter turnout, from electoral 
systems to the number of political parties and even the influence of parental voting habits on 
their children (Endersby and Kriechaus 2008, 601; Jackman and Miller 2004, 139-143; Gidengil, 
Wass, and Valaste 2016, 373), political scientists have also studied the histories of different 
countries’ electoral systems. Jan Sundberg and Bo Sӓrlvik have studied the histories of Finland’s 
and Sweden’s electoral systems, respectively. In the case of Finland, its electoral system has 
undergone no major changes since its creation in 1906 or since Finland gained its independence 
from Russia in 1917. Just like in 1906, Finland still uses a form of PR, a modified d’Hondt 
system, to elect its unicameral (one-house) legislature (Sundberg 2002, 67-68). Sweden, on the 
other hand, has changed its electoral system three times since it turned to an elected, bicameral 
(two-house) parliament in 1866. It used a majority/plurality system with some multimember 
constituencies and some single-member districts until 1911, when it switched to PR and the 
d’Hondt system. Sweden switched to its present modified Saint-Laguë system over two rounds in 
1970, and abolished its bicameral parliament in favor of a unicameral one in 1969 (Sӓrlvik 2002, 
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225-226, 252). While both countries now have PR and unicameral legislatures, they did not both 
start there. 
Including the use of PR and the presence of unicameral legislatures, the similarities 
between Sweden and Finland make it fairly simple to focus on their electoral systems. First, both 
countries (since 1969) have unicameral legislatures (Sundberg 2002, 67-68; Sӓrlvik 2002, 252). 
In Jackman and Miller’s book chapter on institutions and voter turnout, they propose and prove 
that whether a country has a unicameral or bicameral legislature can affect voter turnout. They 
argue that in a unicameral system, the legislature has a more important role in legislation, 
making those elections more important and thereby increasing turnout (Jackman and Miller 
2004, 142, 148-149). Since Sweden and Finland both have unicameral legislatures (Sundberg 
2002, 67-68; Sӓrlvik 2002, 252), this impact will not show up in the explanation of why Sweden 
has a higher voter turnout. 
Both countries also use some form of proportional representation in their legislative 
elections (Sundberg 2002, 252-253; Sӓrlvik 2002, 85). Proportional representation itself has an 
impact on voter turnout, but only under certain circumstances. One of these conditions includes 
strength/level of democracy. Electoral systems have a greater influence on voter turnout in fully 
democratic countries than in less democratic countries (Endersby and Krieckhaus 2008, 606-
608). According to the 2017 Freedom House index, which measures the level of democracy in 
countries around the world, both Sweden and Finland scored a 1—most free in the index’s 
ratings system—in both political rights and civil liberties, essentially meaning both countries are 
fully democratic (Freedom House-Sweden, 2017; Freedom House-Finland 2017). Another 
democracy-related factor that has been argued to have an influence on the impact of electoral 
systems on voter turnout is the age of the democracy: younger democracies have had less 
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experience with how electoral systems work and older democracies have had more experience—
and therefor, the electoral system has a greater impact. While this has been essentially proven 
false (Endersby and Krieckhaus 2008, 607-608), the Swedish and Finnish democracies are both 
over one hundred years old (Sundberg 2002, 67-68; Sӓrlvik 2002, 225-226), so if there is 
anything to this idea, it should not show up in the explanation regarding the difference in turnout 
between the two countries. 
The presence or lack of compulsory voting laws has also been proven to have an effect on 
voter turnout. While they are not always enforced, they do have a significant, positive impact on 
voter turnout in the countries that have them (Jackman and Miller 2004, 143, 149). In the OECD, 
three of the five highest-turnout countries have compulsory voting laws. Additionally, Chile had 
a compulsory voting law until 2012, after which turnout among registered voters plummeted 
from 87% to 42%. Neither Sweden nor Finland have compulsory voting laws (Desilver 2016), so 
there is no chance of a compulsory voting-related turnout difference interfering with a 
comparison of their electoral systems. 
Additionally, Sweden and Finland share a characteristic that actually takes care of some 
of a measurement problem regarding voter turnout. In their article on the influence of electoral 
institutions on voter turnout, James Endersby and Jonathan Krieckhaus mention automatic voter 
registration in the context of discussing how previous literature has measured voter turnout to 
begin with. They explained that previous studies trying to explain turnout have measured turnout 
in two different ways: as the percentage of registered voters and as the percentage of the voting 
age population. They argue that while the latter results in artificially low turnout because of 
ineligible individuals, using the percentage of registered voters has problems too. They argue 
that registering to vote is an indicator that an individual is more likely to vote and, therefore, 
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should not be left out of explanations of voter turnout. They also explain that automatic or 
mandatory registration mostly solves the problem of figuring out which measurement to use 
(Endersby and Krieckhaus 2008, 602-603). With automatic registration, one gets similar turnout 
numbers, regardless of whether one is referring to registered voters or the voting age population. 
Sweden and Finland both have automatic voter registration and four percentage point gaps 
between the two categories (Desilver 2016), thereby eliminating most of the previously 
mentioned measurement problem. 
Sweden and Finland also have another similarity that both makes it easier to focus on just 
their electoral systems and actually eliminates a possible explanation for the difference in turnout 
between them. Both countries are technically high turnout countries, meaning they have high 
levels of voter turnout (Desilver 2016). In the Persson, Wass, and Oscarsson article on the 
generational effect on voter turnout in Swedish elections, the authors noted that the generational 
effect only has a moderate impact in Sweden because it is a high turnout country. In the process 
of making their argument, they also pointed out that the same argument applied to Finland 
(Persson, Wass, and Oscarsson 2013, 252, 264-265). Given that the generational effect has a 
similar effect in both countries, it should not account for much, if any, of the difference in voter 
turnout between the two. The two countries’ similarity in this regard more or less ensures that the 
turnout difference is not actually explained by the generational effect, instead of the two 
countries’ electoral systems. 
While a previous paragraph pointed out that automatic voter registration mostly 
eliminates gaps in turnout between eligible and registered voters, there is still a potential problem 
with the gaps in Sweden and Finland. In Sweden, the percent turnout of registered voters in the 
most recent election is 86%, four points higher than the turnout for the voting age population. 
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However, the percent turnout for the voting age population in Finland is actually four points 
higher at 72% than the turnout for registered voters at 68% (Desilver 2016). This gap could be 
explained by Finland’s lack of a requirement that voters actually reside in Finland. All Finnish 
citizens who meet the age requirement can vote, including those who live abroad. Jan Sundberg 
has pointed out that most of these individuals do not vote, which depresses voter turnout among 
the country’s voting age population (Sundberg 2002, 80). However, since both countries’ use of 
automatic voter registration eliminates most of the measurement problem with using the percent 
turnout of registered voters (Endersby and Krieckhaus 2008, 602-603), the turnout for registered 
voters will be used to study the effects of the two countries’ electoral systems on turnout in order 
to avoid the aforementioned problem. 
In the comparison between voter turnout in Sweden and Finland, the turnout data from 
the most recent elections—2014 and 2015, respectively (Desilver 2016)—will be used. In order 
to avoid the peculiarity in Finland’s turnout gap between registered voters and the voting age 
population (Sundberg 2002, 80), the percentages for turnout of registered voters will be used. 
This comes to 68% for Finland and 86% for Sweden (Desilver 2016). While this would 
essentially control for at least some of the difference in turnout elsewhere, because citizens who 
actually register to vote are already more likely to vote, both Sweden and Finland have automatic 
voter registration, which mostly eliminates this problem (Endersby and Krieckhaus 2008, 602-
603; Desilver 2016). As far as the definition of an electoral system is concerned, the analysis will 
be done based on the two countries’ PR systems and the party systems they produce. Since 
electoral systems impact—and technically include—both the proportionality of translating votes 
into seats and how many political parties a country ends up with (Jackman and Miller 2004, 137, 
148), differences in both between the two countries will be taken into account. Size of 
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constituencies and type of ballot used also constitute part of a country’s electoral system 
(European Parliament 2016, 1-4), so these will be taken into account as well. 
While Sweden and Finland both use PR, they use two different types of PR, which use 
slightly different methods to translate seats into votes. Since 1970, Sweden has used the modified 
Sainte-Laguë method with party lists over two rounds of allocating the 349 seats in their 
unicameral legislature. 310 of these seats are allocated in the first round, and the other 39 are 
allocated in the second round. In the first round, the 310 seats—spread across 29 
constituencies—are allocated proportionally within their respective constituency to all parties 
that have reached at least 12% of the vote in the constituency. In the second round, the modified 
Sainte-Laguë method is applied to the total national vote for all parties which have received at 
least 4% of the national vote. This round is meant to figure out how many total seats a party is 
entitled to nationally. If the total number of seats out of the 310 from the first round is less than a 
party’s national vote total entitles it to, it receives seats out of the remaining 39 to correct this 
(Sӓrlvik 2002, 252-253). 
The modified Sainte-Laguë method itself takes the total number of votes received by 
each party that has reached the threshold in a constituency and divides that number by a divisor 
based on the number of seats a party has won so far times two plus one (divisor = 2x+1). The 
modified part, which is also used by Denmark, makes the first divisor 1.4. After the parties’ 
votes are divided by 1.4, the party with the highest resulting number gets the first seat. Then, the 
party’s original vote total is divided by 3 until its resulting number is the highest again, and the 
divisor becomes 5 and the process starts again. The divisor for any party’s total number of votes 
only increases when they end up with the highest resulting number (and a/another seat) (van Eck, 
Visagie, de Kock 2005, 95-96). For Sweden, this process works the same way in both rounds; the 
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only difference is that in the second round, the national vote totals are used (Sӓrlvik 2002, 252-
253). 
Despite repeated proposals to switch to the modified Sainte-Laguë method, Finland has 
used the d’Hondt method with party lists since 1906. The two hundred seats in the unicameral 
Finnish legislature are allocated among its set constituencies according to population. Within 
each constituency, the d’Hondt method is used over one round to allocate its seats among the 
parties that received votes (Sundberg 2002, 72, 85-87). Under this method, the number of votes 
each party receives is divided by the number of seats the party has already received plus one. The 
party with the highest average as a result of the division gets the seat, the party with the next 
highest average gets the next seat, and the process continues until all the seats in a constituency 
have been allocated (European Parliament 2016, 3-4). Finland has no official electoral threshold, 
and this method tends to give an advantage to large parties in small districts with few 
representatives and small parties in large districts with many representatives. In addition, 
Finland’s electoral system permits electoral alliances among parties, which are then considered 
one party when seats are being allocated (Sundberg 2002, 85-88). 
While the d’Hondt method and the modified Sainte-Laguë method are both types of 
proportional representation—and therefor at least somewhat more proportional than plurality or 
majoritarian systems (Endersby and Krieckhaus 2008, 601)—many believe the modified Sainte-
Laguë method is actually slightly more proportional than the d’Hondt method. The d’Hondt 
method tends to reinforce the advantage parties with high vote totals get when seats are 
allocated, at the expense of smaller parties (European Parliament 2016, 4). Particularly in 
districts with fewer representatives, the disproportionality can be higher (Sundberg 2002, 88). 
However, no method for allocation seats on the basis of votes received is perfectly proportional, 
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since it is impossible to allocate part of a seat (European Parliament 2016, 4). In fact, some have 
argued that there is actually no real difference between the d’Hondt method and the modified 
Sainte-Laguë method. For them, the initial division of vote totals by 1.4 in the modified Sainte-
Laguë method puts it on the same track as the d’Hondt method in terms of seat allocation. In this 
case, only the pure form of the Sainte-Laguë method, which starts with an initial divisor of 1, is 
noticeably more proportional than the d’Hondt method (van Eck, Visagie, de Kock 2005, 94-96). 
Regardless of whether or not there is actually a difference though, people who want to shift to 
the modified Sainte-Laguë method use the argument that it is more proportional when they make 
their argument (Sundberg 2002, 77). 
However, Sweden and Finland not only use different types of PR, but they use them 
differently, which might account for something. Sweden uses the modified Sainte-Laguë method 
over two rounds of seat allocation for a grand total of 349 seats, while Finland uses the d’Hondt 
method over one round for a total of 200 seats. For each, the first round allocates seats among 
parties within districts (Sundberg 2002, 72, 85-87; Sӓrlvik 2002, 252-253). This results in either 
a slightly less proportional allocation in Finland than Sweden (European Parliament 2016, 4) or 
no measureable difference (van Eck, Visagie, de Kock 2005, 95), depending on which argument 
about the different methods is accurate. However, Sweden has a second round of vote allocation 
designed to ensure that the country’s political parties receive a number of seats as proportional to 
the number of votes they receive as possible (Sӓrlvik 2002, 253).  
With the total number of seats each party has received among all the districts in mind, the 
second round of allocation takes each party’s national vote total and uses the modified Sainte-
Laguë method to calculate how many seats each party should have nationally. If this number is 
larger than the number of seats a party has actually received, then they receive more seats from 
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among the 39 seats allocated in the second round to get the numbers closer together. If a party 
has somehow received more seats than this second round shows that they are entitled to, they do 
not receive more seats, nor do they lose seats. Parties that have not reached the 4% threshold for 
the national vote do not receive more seats, but they do keep their seats in districts where they 
have won more than 12% of the vote. This second round is intended to iron out as much of any 
national-level disproportionality that exists as possible (Sӓrlvik 2002, 252-253). Finland’s 
electoral system possesses no such method for mitigating disproportionality on the national level 
(Sundberg 2002, 85-87), leaving it with no way of correcting any amount of the 
disproportionality that exists in all electoral systems (European Parliament 2016, 4). 
While the Finnish electoral system possesses no method for correcting any 
disproportionality between votes a party gets and seats it receives, it does offer parties a way to 
get around some of the biases in its electoral system. The Finnish electoral system allows parties 
to form electoral alliances, which can offer smaller parties a better chance at getting seats in a 
system that gives larger parties an advantage. In an electoral alliance, the parties involved 
essentially run as one larger party, pooling both resources and voters to maximize the number of 
seats they receive. They try to avoid competing with each other; instead, they run candidates in 
different districts and encourage their supporters to vote for each other’s candidates. This way, 
they can try to get some of the advantages reserved for larger parties under the d’Hondt method 
without actually being a larger party. Electoral alliances generally only last for the duration of 
the election; the parties usually go back to being separate parties immediately after the election 
(Sundberg 2002, 85-86).  
While the presence in both the Swedish and Finnish electoral systems of mechanisms for 
mitigating disproportionality in the translation of votes into seats (Sӓrlvik 2002, 252-253; 
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Sundberg 2002, 85-87) might sound like it should render both systems equally proportional—
rendering electoral system differences irrelevant in accounting for the difference in voter turnout 
(Endersby and Krieckhaus 2008, 601-602) between Sweden and Finland, that is not the case. 
Sweden’s second round of seat allocation does not require the competing political parties to do 
anything particularly out of the ordinary. They just have to get more than 4% of the vote 
nationally to be eligible for extra seats—provided, of course, they meet the 12% vote threshold 
for constituencies and receive any seats to begin with (Sӓrlvik 2002, 253). In Finland, the parties 
have to form electoral alliances to have a chance at getting the benefits the Finnish system gives 
larger parties. If a party cannot form an electoral alliance, they do not get those advantages 
(Sundberg 2002, 85-87). Parties need to do extra work to gain the advantages offered by 
Finland’s mechanism, and they do not like to do so unless they are sure they will get something 
out of it—which an electoral alliance does not guarantee (Jackman and Miller 2004. 137-138; 
Sundberg 2002), 85-87. 
Electoral systems, however, are not just how seats are translated into votes. Electoral 
systems also involve party systems. Proportional representation systems tend to produce 
multiparty systems, which provide voters with more options, while SMP (single-member 
plurality) systems tend to produce two parties at most. Parties in a PR system also have an 
incentive to be more spread out ideologically because they know voters have more options, while 
parties in SMP systems have an incentive to move toward the ideological center. With more 
parties to choose from, voters in PR systems like Sweden and Finland are more likely to have a 
party they strongly agree with and/or one they strongly disagree with, which makes them more 
likely to vote—and increases voter turnout. The opposite is true in SMP systems (Jackman and 
Miller 2004, 137-140). 
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However, multiparty systems—and by extension, PR systems—are not perfect. More 
parties do give voters more options, but too many parties is not exactly a good thing. The 
presence of more parties in an election can make it more likely that no party will have enough 
seats in the legislature to form a government on its own. Without a majority, parties have to form 
coalitions—essentially alliances in the government—in order to govern, and voters have no say 
in the formation of these coalitions. In this case, the election is less important in the selection of a 
government. If the necessity for forming a coalition takes place frequently enough, it makes 
having a say in the makeup of the government harder for the voters. With elections less 
important to government formation, people have less incentive to vote. So, past a certain number 
of parties, voter turnout can actually go down due to frequent coalition governments (Jackman 
and Miller 2004, 141-142, 148). 
Since its independence from Russia in 1917, Finland has had many coalition 
governments. Over 67 cabinets/governments have been formed since 1917, and nearly all of 
them have been coalition governments. Finland’s electoral system has ended up producing a 
party system without any kind of dominant party. The parties around which the coalition 
governments have been built have changed from time to time. However, the country’s six main 
parties have been in existence since the beginning, with the number of smaller parties rising and 
falling over time. Today, Finland has ten political parties, making the party system more 
fragmented than before, when it had fewer parties. Between the relatively large number of parties 
and the frequent formation of coalition governments (Sundberg 2002, 91, 68, 86), voter turnout 
in Finland should be lower because these factors make elections less important, which gives 
people less of an incentive to vote (Jackman and Miller 2004, 141-142). 
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Since it established a unicameral legislature in 1969 and switched to its current electoral 
system at the same time, Sweden has not had terribly frequent coalition governments, but they 
have had several minority governments—single-party governments where the governing party 
has a plurality of seats but not a majority, and does not elect to form a coalition. This has been 
attributed to both Sweden’s electoral system and a decline in support for the previously dominant 
Social Democrats. Additionally, minority governments do require a measure of cooperation with 
other parties in the legislature to keep the government in position. However, they do not involve 
as much compromise. Sweden also has a six/seven party system, but these parties have been 
relatively consistent. While Sweden could be considered to have too many parties (Sӓrlvik 2002, 
252-259), its lack of frequent coalition governments and smaller number of parties compared to 
Finland (Sundberg 2002, 86) does mean that legislative elections matter more in terms of 
government formation, giving people greater incentive to vote in them—which should raise 
turnout levels (Jackman and Miller 2004, 141-142). 
In addition, Sweden’s electoral system also includes an electoral threshold, a percent of 
the total vote a party has to reach in order to qualify for seats. For Sweden, this number is at 12% 
of the vote in a constituency or 4% of the national vote (Sӓrlvik 2002, 252-253). The electoral 
threshold was set in 1969/1970, at the same time as the establishment of the unicameral 
legislature and the addition of a second round of seat allocation, with the intention of preventing 
certain smaller parties—the Communists—from gaining seats in the legislature. While the 
threshold has failed to keep the Communists out, it does appear to have accomplished something 
else: the prevention of a relatively large number of small parties getting into the legislature and 
causing instability (Sӓrlvik 2002, 252-260). Finland, on the other hand, has no electoral threshold 
whatsoever, and the Finnish party system has more (smaller) parties and more instability. This 
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has led to more frequent coalition governments (Sundberg 2002, 85-86, 91), which can lead to 
less important elections and lower voter turnout (Jackman and Miller 2004, 141-142). 
In addition to the method by which votes are translated into seats and a country’s party 
system, the size of a country’s constituencies is also part of their electoral system—and therefore 
can have an impact on their voter turnout (European Parliament 2016, 5). Political scientists have 
shown that district magnitude, or the size of a constituency/number of representatives it has, has 
an impact on the proportionality of a country’s electoral system (Sundberg 2002, 87-88)—which 
impacts voter turnout (Endersby and Krieckhaus 2008, 601-602). Small magnitude districts are 
less proportional than larger ones. Finland’s constituencies vary widely in terms of district 
magnitude, with some smaller (and less proportional) and others larger (and more proportional). 
Overall, though, disproportionality has increased (Sundberg 2002, 85-90), which should 
contribute to lower voter turnout because of lower proportionality (Endersby and Krieckhaus 
2008, 601-602). 
On the other hand, overall disproportionality has remained consistently low in Sweden 
over the last forty years. Disproportionality declined noticeably when the country added a second 
round of seat allocation to its electoral system in 1969/1970, and has neither increased nor 
decreased significantly since (Sӓrlvik 2002, 239). Disproportionality in Sweden is also 
significantly lower than it is in Finland (Sӓrlvik 2002, 239; Sundberg 2002, 86). Since lower 
disproportionality is associated with the electoral system in question being more proportional, it 
serves as an incentive for people to vote because their votes are more likely to translate more 
directly into seats. Since the system is more proportional, people see it as more fair and are more 
likely to vote (Endersby and Krieckhaus 2008, 601-602). So, since Sweden has lower overall 
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disproportionality than Finland (Sӓrlvik 2002, 239; Sundberg 2002, 86), it makes sense that the 
former would have higher voter turnout than the latter (Desilver 2016). 
In addition to the method of translating votes into seats, party system, and the size of 
constituencies, the type of ballot a country uses is also part of its electoral system (European 
Parliament 2016, 4-5). Sweden uses open party lists with the opportunity for voters to give a 
“personal preference vote” to a specific candidate within the list they vote for (Sӓrlvik 2002, 
260-261). Party lists in general fit into PR systems in that voters in PR systems are voting for 
parties and the representatives that ultimately occupy the seats the party gets are the individuals 
on these lists. Open party lists simply mean that voters can see the candidates on the list 
(Jackman and Miller 2004, 139-140). The personal preference vote in Sweden has the potential 
to override a party’s ordering of candidates on its list in a given constituency. If the personal 
preference votes for a candidate total at least 8% of the party’s total vote, that candidate’s name 
gets moved to the top of the list, making them first in line for a seat (Sӓrlvik 2002, 260-261). 
This provides voters with the opportunity to have a more direct say in what their government 
looks like, which has been proven to help increase voter turnout (Endersby and Krieckhaus 2008, 
601-602). 
Finland, on the other hand, uses candidate preference voting instead of party lists, and has 
since 1953. While referred to as “single member lists” they are not lists at all. Instead, voters 
choose from among individual candidates representing parties. Votes for a given candidate are 
then counted toward the party or electoral alliance that the candidate represents (Sundberg 2002, 
77). While this does give voters a greater say in what their government looks like in terms of 
choosing specific people—which has been proven to increase voter turnout (Endersby and 
Krieckhaus 2008, 601-602)—it is not without its problems. In a PR system, this has the potential 
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to increase intra-party competition and party fragmentation (Sӓrlvik 2002, 262). Increased 
fragmentation can lead to too many options for voters which, in a system where coalition 
governments are frequent, can depress voter turnout because elections are less important to 
government formation (Jackman and Miller 2004, 147-149). Unfortunately for Finland, it fits all 
of these requirements (Sundberg 2002, 85-86, 91), so lower turnout in Finland compared to 
Sweden should be no surprise. 
There is one more important factor in evaluating Sweden’s and Finland’s electoral 
systems and whether or not the differences between the two can explain why Sweden has an 18 
percentage point higher voter turnout among registered voters than Finland (Desilver 2016). As 
has been previously argued regarding PR systems in general, proportional representation 
encourages people to vote because they see it as a fair system that will better represent their 
votes in the legislature. Here, perception is key. If people do not perceive a system as fair or 
likely to represent them sufficiently, then they are less likely to vote. The same general idea is 
true of electoral systems in countries with different levels of democracy: people believe elections 
are less important—and less fair in general—in less democratic countries, so a more 
representative system like PR has less of an impact on voter turnout (Endersby and Krieckhaus 
2008, 601-603, 606-607). 
While political scientists are fairly consistent in the belief that PR systems in general are 
more proportional—and encourage higher voter turnout—than other types of electoral system 
(Endersby and Krieckhaus 2008, 601-602; Jackman and Miller 2004, 137-140), there is less 
agreement when it comes to types of PR. Between the two main types, the Sainte-Laguë method 
and the d’Hondt method, there is no agreement regarding which one is more proportional. Some 
political scientists argue that the Sainte-Laguë method, modified or not, is the more proportional 
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of the two (European Parliament 2016, 4; Sundberg 2002, 85). Others, meanwhile, argue that the 
Sainte-Laguë method is only more proportional than the d’Hondt method in its pure form and 
that the modified Saint-Laguë method—used by Sweden and Denmark, among others—is 
essentially identical to the d’Hondt method in proportionality (van Eck, Visagie, and de Kock 
2005, 95; Sundberg 2002, 85). 
However, voters and the politicians making decisions about what a country’s electoral 
system will look like do not necessarily see things the same way. How voters perceive a system, 
regardless of whether their perception is correct or not, is an important factor in whether or not 
they vote (Endersby and Krieckhaus 2008, 601-602). And voters—and politicians—in Sweden 
and Finland definitely have opinions about their own, and each other’s, electoral systems 
(Sӓrlvik 2002, 247-249; Sundberg 2002, 77). In the case of Sweden, these perceptions resulted in 
a switch to the modified Sainte-Laguë method—from the d’Hondt method—in 1952 (Sӓrlvik 
2002, 247-249). Finland, meanwhile, has maintained its use of the d’Hondt method since 1906, 
despite complaints from smaller parties (Sundberg 2002, 67-68, 76-77). 
When Sweden made the switch to the modified Sainte-Laguë method in 1952, it did so in 
order to render the formation of potentially problematic electoral cartels/alliances unnecessary 
for the Agrarian Union (later the Center Party) and other smaller parties like it. What the 
Agrarian Union and its coalition partner in government, the Social Democrats, wanted was a 
system that was more favorable to small parties than the d’Hondt method. So, they proposed a 
switch to the modified Sainte-Laguë method, with the idea that its use of only odd-number 
divisors would make it more proportional to smaller parties like the Agrarian Union. The parties 
involved in making this decision saw the Sainte-Laguë method as the more proportional of the 
two. The parties were also well aware that proportional representation had become ingrained in 
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Sweden’s political culture, so trying for a less proportional system was out of the question on the 
grounds that the voters would not like it. The same logic was also at work in 1969/1970 when 
Sweden added a second round of seat allocation—voters like proportionality, so more 
proportionality is a good thing (Sӓrlvik 2002, 247-254).  
Smaller parties in Finland have been making a very similar argument ever since the 
country adopted the d’Hondt method in 1906. The ongoing discussion in the Finnish legislature 
has always included trying to increase the proportionality of the country’s electoral system. 
Small parties have always complained that the d’Hondt method puts them at a disadvantage in 
terms of the translation of votes to seats and have proposed changes running from switching to 
the Sainte-Laguë method to changing the number of constituencies. For example, one of 
Finland’s political parties, the Swedish People’s Party, repeatedly proposed a switch to the 
Sainte-Laguë method in the mid-20th century, having seen such changes occurring elsewhere in 
Scandinavia (including Sweden). However, the proposals were defeated by larger parties worried 
about fragmentation and their own shares of votes and seats. Seeing parties argue about the 
country’s electoral system must have had some kind of effect on Finnish voters; they are 
essentially being told that their electoral system is not as proportional as the Sainte-Laguë 
method (Sundberg 2002, 73, 76-77). And a negative perception of the electoral system leads to 
lower turnout in the country in question (Endersby and Krieckhaus 2008, 601-602). 
Regardless of how it is measured, the difference in voter turnout between Sweden and 
Finland is noticeable: 10 percentage points among the voting age populations and 18 percentage 
points among registered voters (Desilver 2016). Given that voter turnout is the “canary in the 
coal mine” of broader political participation (Jackman and Miller 2004, 137), it is certainly worth 
asking why Sweden has higher levels of voter turnout than Finland. The similarities between the 
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two countries both make them excellent subjects for comparison and eliminate several potential 
explanations for differences in turnout. Both use some form of proportional representation to 
allocate seats in their legislatures, both have unicameral legislatures, neither has compulsory 
voting, both have multiparty systems, both have automatic voter registration, both have 
undergone significant changes in their governments in the last century (Sӓrlvik 2002, 252-253; 
Sundberg 2002, 67, 72-73), and both are classified as high-turnout countries (Persson, Wass, and 
Oscarsson 2013, 252, 264-265). 
What the two countries do not have in common—and what best accounts for their 
different levels of voter turnout—are the details of their electoral systems. Sweden uses the 
modified Sainte-Laguë method over two rounds of seat allocation with open party lists and the 
opportunity to indicate candidate preference, and has a multiparty system of 6-7 parties and 
fairly low disproportionality (Sӓrlvik 2002, 252-253, 259-261). Finland, meanwhile, uses the 
arguably less proportional d’Hondt system over a single round with candidate preference voting, 
possess a multiparty system of around 10 parties, and has considerably higher disproportionality 
than Sweden (Sundberg 2002, 85-87, 77; Sӓrlvik 2002, 239).  
Both disproportionality and exceptionally high numbers of parties have been found to 
depress voter turnout (Jackman and Miller 2004, 147-149). Sweden, meanwhile, possesses a 
second round of seat allocation designed to do what the Finnish system cannot: eliminate most 
(if not all) of the disproportionality in the first round (Sӓrlvik 2002, 252-253). In the end, 
however, parties and voters in both countries are more or less in agreement in how proportional 
the two electoral systems are. Sweden’s electoral system is seen as more proportional (Sӓrlvik 
2002, 252-253; Sundberg 2002, 76-77), and when people see a system as more proportional, they 
are more likely to vote—and voter turnout goes up (Endersby and Krieckhaus 2008, 601-602). 
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Given the extent of what is included in an electoral system—the formula used to translate votes 
into seats, constituency size, number of political parties, type of ballot used, and presence or 
absence of compulsory voting laws (Jackman and Miller 2004, 137-140; European Parliament 
2016, 4-5)—it is highly likely that the differences between Sweden’s and Finland’s electoral 
systems is the biggest factor in Sweden having a higher voter turnout compared to Finland. 
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